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A principal cause of the disregard or demonization of women’s agency is the ‘functional fiction’ of autonomy. Whilst arguably a necessary means of attribution of causation and responsibility for human action, the concept of autonomy – sliced ‘thick’ or ‘thin’ – is characterised by a liberal individualism that eschews the complexity of women’s agency for an atomistic abstractive notion of individual volition and reason. As a result, attributions of victimhood or transgression have to be ‘inscribed’ onto women. 

Drawing on the example of rape and sexual consent, I will seek to argue that if we are to adequately understand and compose a notion of women’s agency that represents the choices, experiences and situatedness of women, it is necessary to recognise that an idea of ‘autonomy’ will not do. Instead, we need a notion of agency that sits dialectically between reason and affect, recognises the relationship between embodiment, discourse and the cultural, contextual and conjunctural constitution of a given space and moment of agency, and neither dilutes womanhood within a post-modern contingency nor reifies it to a defining category but recognises it as a presence that characterises how we see agency and how it is seen by the agent. 
...Concepts are more important for what they do than for what they mean. Their value lies in the way in which they are able to provide a purchase for critical thought upon particular problems of the present.(Rose 1999,p9)

 "When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less."     
"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so many different things."
"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master      that's all. (Carroll 1872, p72)

Whether demonised or diminished, one central contention on the nature of women’s capacity and ability to choose in their sexual conduct is that it is - or it should be - rooted in their individual, personal autonomy. This is a relatively recent development in the context of historically patriarchal and patrilineal descriptions of women. It is conceived as being progressive because it involves recognition of women’s freedom of choice and self-governance, dissembling patriarchal characterisations of women as adjuncts or dependents - of ‘Adam’s rib’ - and respecting women’s dignity and equality as individuals alongside men. Seeing women ‘in their own right’ is a foundation to rejecting objectification and oppression. 

It creates a problem, however, in how we conceive women’s relationships in contemporary society: to social and cultural structures, institutions, processes, orthodoxies, ideologies, contexts, conjunctures and other - male and female - agents. If these social and cultural ensembles are infused with hetero-patriarchal or hetero-normative discourses, and so have lineages, tendencies and determinations that reinforce and normalise male power and centrality in social and sexual life, to what extent can women enjoy choice and self-governance and how can that be enhanced? Yet a focus on the limits and constraints to women's choice within social contexts can then lead to a diminishment of any appreciation of the choices women do exercise. This problem has been central to feminist and post-feminist debates - balancing the political and ideological recognition of women's empowerment against the continuing impact of those constraining contexts.​[2]​

The problem is represented in the characterisation of women as autonomous - from the Greek auto nomos, or self-governance (the literal translation is 'self-rule').​[3]​ What might apparently seem a semantic consideration – whether autonomy or another characterisation best describes women’s self-governance and freedom to choose under hetero-patriarchy - is significant in understanding gendered nature of modern and contemporary societies. What is at stake is represented in two trends in the way sexual violence against women is seen. The first is a demonization of women who are sexually expressive in dress, manner or conduct, when they report rape and violence. Here, their autonomy is regarded as being causal and responsible for the rape or violence they suffer. Their conduct - however much its construction by the rapist is untenable and incredible - becomes a central referent for understading the episode of violence. 

The second is the women as a passive creature that is unable to protest clearly (which is often imagined only as physically fighting and screaming) when a man forces himself upon her, violently or otherwise. This produces a ‘victimology’ around her, seeing her as somehow less than autonomous, providing succour for the defence of the perpetrator, with appeals to mens rea and claims of legitimate belief that she consented in the absence of struggle (even if no credible explanation for belief is offered). Both characterisations, and their diminution or exemplification of women's choice, create a dichotomy of parody that fails to accurately capture the power of contexts and the nature of women's agency within them. 

This chapter argues that the concept of autonomy is at the root of a misconception about self-governance and choice that underpins such these sorts of demonizations or victimologies. Autonomy is a ‘functional fiction’ that individuates, abstracts and decontextualises the real conditions under which women are constrained in exercising free sexual choice. This is not to deny women can exercise choice and govern themselves, but it is to argue that there is a context and agent sensitivity to the circumstances of their choice that is more complex than any notion of autonomy allows. Whilst argued as a necessary means of attribution of causation and responsibility for human action, the concept of autonomy – sliced ‘thick’ or ‘thin’ – is characterised by a liberal individualism that eschews the complexity of women’s agency for an atomistic abstractive notion of individual volition and (masculine) reason.​[4]​ Attributions of victimhood or transgression are ‘inscribed’ onto women, so assessment of the scope and contexts for agency that a women may have had are subverted by the assumption of autonomy that she is adjudged to be able to exercise in a given situation. Hence the conceptual roots of understanding individual choice in society become the building blocks for a reinforcement of fundamental injustices. 

This is not an original argument - feminist theorists have raised the problem in a range of social and cultural contexts. What is perhaps distinct about this particular articulation of the argument is the focus on the intrinsic problem of the concept of autonomy. The persistence of the use of autonomy in liberal societies and so the persistence of the 'baggage' of its 'functional fiction', its abstraction from context and its misrepresentation of women's experience impedes the intellectual work that needs to press for social justice and equity. As such, the suggestion is that it is replaced rather than qualified. 

The discussion is essentially one of distinguishing autonomy and agency. This is not a semantic discussion. Autonomy speaks to a notion of self-governance borne of philosophical and political discourse, abstracted as an essence of human conduct and progress in a rational society. The autonomous subject begins with a sense of definite self-constitution and retains that constitutive character in the contexts in which they are located. The autonomous individual is pre-figured, and by their qualities they are able to negotiate their social and cultural worlds. This autonomous individual is fashioned upon men (and often a minority  - bourgeois or wealthy men).​[5]​ So, the very act of engaging with autonomy as part of an attempt to describe or interpret a particular circumstance is already alien to women and misrepresents their experience.  

 Agency speaks to the negotiation of hetero-patriarchal contexts, where women choose and decide within circumstances that are context and agent sensitive. The capacity to choose is sensitive to two different factors: the capacities of the agents themselves - represented in factors such as self-confidence, experience, education, social status; and the character of contexts - represented by their cultural and institutional discourses, forms, customs and practices.​[6]​  

Agency contains within it the aspiration for the conditions for free choice and self-governance described by autonomy, but recognises the particular contingencies and constraints of agent and context that material conditions of social and cultural conjuncture bring. Agents are both self-constituting but at the same time constituted by the context and conjuncture within which they are set, and this contradictory duality in 'making' and 'remaking' the agent creates a constant and continuous tension between agent and context. There is no abstraction from context, no pre-figuration and so no understanding outside of women in their worlds. Rather, the political act of asserting agency over autonomy is a politics of truth that aligns concepts with material experiences.  

If the concept of autonomy were to be representative of the human condition as it should be characterised and conceived, few would wish to object to a position where women were autonomous, because all humans would be autonomous. However, the transposition of should over what is, as with women's autonomy today, is unhelpful. This point might be extended to class, disability, ethnicity and other divisions. It raises the question of whether autonomy is useful at all, beyond presenting an abstracted ideal. Agency provides the grammar for analysis and a politics or truth that recognises that is never quite reaches ought. 

Women and the Construction of Autonomy

The idea of women as sexually autonomous – as self-governing subjects with rights and a freedom of choice over their bodies– is a relatively recent phenomena. Whilst historical evidence is unsystematic and limited, the opening scene of Thomas Hardy’s (1994) The Mayor of Casterbridge, where Michael Henchard sells his wife and baby daughter after a drunken row, is symbolically representative of patrilineage, the institution of marriage, and the patriarchal structure of social and cultural life the 19th Century. Voices of dissent such as Mary Wollstonecraft and John Stuart Mill, as forerunners to modern feminism, were exceptions (and in most cases, exceptional women). Wollstonecraft’s prodigious work as a writer and philosopher was overlooked until late 20th century feminist thinkers retrieved her from the posterity of a scandalously unorthodox 18th century lifestyle, and belie her difficult life of struggles and tribulations.​[7]​ Helen Taylor, who was a collaborator in much of Mill’s major works was invisible in respect of public acknowledgement.​[8]​  It is indicative of the position of women in the 19th century that the most successful writers  - George Sand and George Eliot, and the Bronte sisters - wrote under male pseudonyms, Women belonged to men and held the status of property, if romantic ideologies gave a semblance of love and natural order,

Women slowly accrued legal rights, changed social entitlements and political suffrage and recognition within liberal and social democratic regimes through the 20th Century because they had growing political visibility through their struggles (and a groundswell of male political support). There was a broad commitment towards egalitarianism in these societies after the Second World War, and as such there was a greater political visibility of independent women in the public sphere and greater independence of women's living conditions in the private sphere. This was, however, a long and difficult, unfinished struggle. The idea of women's autonomy appears first as desire, then aspiration, then embodiment behind concrete political campaigns and policy developments, its success or limitations often dependent upon which feminist reading is being offered.  

This historical trajectory has been a story of advances for women as individuals within a liberal ideological construct. Women are accorded the characteristic of autonomy and the capacity to make free choices. This is essential to a liberal society, where society is a sum of individuals, constituted through their participation in markets where contracts of exchange bring the sum of their wants and desires together with their skills, labour and resources. Individuals must be free to choose and able to make their own reasonable judgements in order to be held responsible for what they do. Further, individuals decisions require recognition by themselves and in society, hence the foundations of law by contract, where proposal, consent and agreement are the basis for recognising  and recording choices. In the case of sexual relations, the contract is abstractly one of individuals seeking their satisfaction in the marketplace for sexual or life partners, though this sexual contract is clearly both historically and politically unequal and does not approximate to women's experience until the end of the 1960's.​[9]​

The basis for this notion of individual autonomy comes from Immanuel Kant (1996), who posits enlightenment as founded on rationality and the possession of a will that imposes rationality over influence or irrationality in thinking and conduct. For Kant, rationality is central to the ascription of autonomy. Focussed on the struggle to leave behind religious doctrine that specified metaphysical determinations beyond human comprehension, and grasp science and rationality as the means of enlightenment where humans take on responsibility for themselves and their governance, Kant's emphasis on autonomy is understandable. The individuals' rationality is essentially what allows for the development of an enlightened and reason-based civil and political society based on moral sentiments (Kant 1997).

The most prominent expression of the idea of the autonomous individual within liberalism is in the work of John Stuart Mill (1998), where liberty is both the most important characteristic of a liberal society and arises from the rational will and capacity to exercise that will free of interference. As Gray (1983, p85) observes
.....human beings are understood to be engaged in recurrently revising the forms of life and modes of experience which they have inherited, and by which 'human nature' itself is constituted in any given time and space. In this account of man as a creature engaged in an endless process of self-transformation, what distinguishes human beings from members of the other animal species is only their powers of reflexive thought and deliberative choice.

Individual autonomy is a central building block to the idea of a liberal society, not just as an intellectual construct but as an ideological description - both concrete and in aspiration - as to the trajectory of societies inspired by liberal ideas and values. Liberalism is undermined by the absence of autonomy. Hence the importance of autonomy as an aspiration  characteristic in charting women's equality. This association of free individuals making choices in their market interactions requires legal and moral codification through the contract, which both evidences and represents the exercise of autonomy through free choice. In a capitalist and market society, it is the autonomous individual who is characterised as the possessive individual whose life and liberty are expressed through the acquisition of both the freedom to express their thoughts and property and assets as indicative of the fruits of their liberty (with honourable exceptions like the clergy, though not the church itself).​[10]​  

The problem with autonomy

Of course, there is a recognition within liberal thought that autonomy is qualified. Lindley (1986, p63-70), for example, sets it against degrees of heteronomy that restrict the desire, will or capacity to be autonomous.  Lindley sees as autonomy as a matter of degrees, and sees part of the problem in thinking about autonomy as being the conflation between being autonomous and exercising autonomy. This distinction lies in recognising that humans are and can be autonomous and recognising that they cannot always exercise that autonomy, such as when they are coerced by others, or when they are imprisoned by the state.

The relationship between autonomy and liberty is instructive. Autonomy has a strong relationship to Berlin's (1969) notion of a positive liberty - a freedom to do what a person chooses. The exercise of liberty is indicative of the autonomy of the individual. Also, in a legal and moral sense, autonomy and liberty have a strong relationship with the idea of informed, or valid, consent. The act of consenting to a proposed agreement or action is at the centre of the idea of free choice expressed through a contract with another. This is represented in Rawls (1971) claim that '...acting autonomously is acting from principles that we could consent to as free and equal rational beings.'  

Yet Berlin identified two sets of liberties - positive and negative. As important as the freedom to do something is, the freedom from those things - coercion, threat, undue influence - that impede free choice is as important. The concept of autonomy, notwithstanding a recognition of constraints to its exercise, puts legal, moral and political emphasis on being free. Autonomy is central to what it is to be an individual in society. It is both a characteristic and an aspiration for both individuals and the society they live in. It therefore always concentrates on the composition of being the autonomous individual, and warns against the possible constraints to being autonomous, be they paternalism, authoritarian coercion and constraint, undue influence, manipulation or force. 

The problem with this rational thinking lies with the constitution of the autonomous individual. It makes the assumption that they are a static, unified, atomised and independent in a social terrain and context they navigate with varying success or failure. They are represented abstractly, with no sense of particular identity characteristics, and seeing contexts largely as arena for manoeuvre to achieve goals. What autonomy represents is fetishised - taken out of a complex picture of human interaction in contexts and made the focus or main route of explication of human conduct. It is also reified, insofar as it is the root and starting point upon which each individual case of judging human conduct rests. Any situation of social interaction has two or more autonomous individuals, who may then be identified as having constraints to exercising their autonomy. These constraints can often be clearly identified, for example someone being coercive, and the role of law and political authorities is to act against it (and protect either the autonomy of the individual or the ascribed rights accorded those who are not recognised as autonomous, such as severely mentally impaired people). 

Yet whilst people may be rational, both the cultural construction of their rationality and the cultural construction of their life experience in informing their rational judgement is questionable. Michel Foucault points to the processes by which power circulates between individuals in such a way as to not simply involve the recognition of power and autonomy within and owned by particular abstract categories - such as the individual or the state. Rather, power is within the discursive construction of each situation within which people find themselves, unequally distributed and instantiated in institutions, orthodoxies, processes and authorities, but nevertheless characterised by the particular social and cultural context within which social agents are located. Hence Foucault's concern about 'normalisation' and the way in which agents self-regulated themselves by internalising particular patterns of prejudice and pathology as much as having them imposed upon subjects. ​[11]​ 

This criticism of the abstraction of autonomy and the individual calls for a distinct vocabulary that better represents these complexities. Discussing people as agents rather than individuals brings to the fore the complexities of people as both self-constituting and constituted by their context. Rather than seeing the individual as an atomised and closed individual who operates within a context as an independent actor, the constitutive complexities of the agent make space for biographical subjectivities and fragmented selves, intersubjective relations and contextually sensitive agents.​[12]​ This is neither a relativist proposition nor a surrender of the capacity of the agent to formulate rational responses to situations and phenomena. What it does is represent the complexity and context sensitivity to social behaviour. 

This is reflected in feminist critiques of liberalism, feminist standpoint theory and intersectionality as a theoretical approach to identity and difference.​[13]​ The idea that an agent and their actions cannot be removed from their situatedness in social and cultural contexts is an important corrective to the universal, one-dimensional rational 'man' of liberal philosophy, whilst not falling into the trap of the post-modern subject, which ironically revels in the relativist, fragmentary subject reading of contexts with endless contingencies for negotiation. The corrective to this is to recognise that contexts are material and historical in character. They require critical analysis and can be decoded. Hence the critical fissure between post-modernists relativism that seeks to assert the contingent possibilities in every circumstance, and feminist and materialist critiques, who locate their analysis in a changing, contextually sensitive yet still materially unequal and oppressive world.

Autonomy, then, provides for a constitution of the individual that predisposes to a focus on choice and contingency and to looking at constraints and cultural and political exercises of power through structure and culture as impediments to autonomy. This formulates the central constitutive features of the subject as static, unified, atomised and independent. In contrast, when individuals are conceived as agents, the contextual, conjunctural and intersubjective  dimensions that bound their agency are conceived not apart from but connected with them (indeed, their individuality is brought into question). The agent is more complex, balancing self-constitution with being constituted, subject to forms of fluidity, plurality, plasticity and interdependence, dialectically, with the agents, cultures, situatedness, customs and practices within which they interrelate. 

Of course, autonomy has been of importance in understanding the individual in relation to society for two reasons. The first, traced here, is a philosophical and historical conception that is criticised for its lack of sensitivity in understanding agency yet retains its power of aspiration. We can still aspire to a society where everyone is given the space to exercise self-governance. The second is more political. Liberalism by its nature, in its ideas of toleration, equality, rights and justice, is preconceived by the idea of society as the sum of individuals. If individuals are not free, rational, autonomous agents, the market and its constitution in the law, with its judicial process of accountability and responsibility, cannot be sustained. Put simply, there is a 'functional fiction' to autonomy. Unless the functional fiction that individuals are free, reasonable and therefore responsible for their actions, it is impossible to credit them alone for their conduct or hold them responsible for it. The more their agency is conceived as being complex and interconnected with structures, cultures and contexts/conjunctures, the more notions of individuated credit, achievement and responsibility become questionable. 

Of course, in any form of society there is a definite need to hold agents responsible for their agency. This 'functional fiction' needs to be retained to have some sense of accountability and sanction against criminal acts. There is a difference, however, between starting from the point of view of autonomy and its individualised frame of reference, and starting with agency as a complex construct of constitutive and self-constitutive factors. The latter sees judgements of individual responsibility as pragmatic responses to social and political problems that require longer term and more structurally constituted cultural and political responses, whilst the former sees it as a logical and correspondent consequence of the individual's choices. The latter recognises that however far agents make their own judgements and actions, they do so within powerful and power-infused discourses and relations that shape and sometimes determine agent's conduct. 

Autonomy, Agency and the case of Rape and Sexual Violence​[14]​

Rape law provides a credible and serious illustration of how conceptual presumption and incoherence articulates within law and politics, with results that are damaging to women and to the idea of justice.​[15]​ Rape law has been an area of continual concern since the 1970’s as women’s and victim’s activism began to assert a case not represented adequately in official statistics, that women were the victims of an unchecked epidemic of male sexual violence. A number of high profile cases, notably R versus Morgan fuelled a growing sense of public outrage that rape victims find the judicial system focusing its investigation and deliberations on the credibility of the victim rather than the offence of the male.​[16]​ The legal system invoked a ‘double jeopardy’ in which the victim of rape was scrutinised for the veracity of her story, partly divined by the women’s perceived character, evidenced by her sexual history, mode of dress, social attitudes and prior communications, which were seen as contextual to the offence. This approach to ‘proving’ the women’s case gave rise to prejudicial judgements of credibility in questioning by the police (at a time when specialist rape services and experienced officers in rape cases were marginal and rare) and in the court, where the woman was the focus for defence council scrutiny, often at distressing length and in distressing detail. At the same time, the male account was subject to two defences. The first was the defence that the rape was consenting. Since the law prior to the 2003 Act contained no definition of what consent might be, it created difficulties that played to the idea of a ‘reasonable doubt’. This was often crudely applied. Women who did not have substantial physical injury might have it implied that they do not refuse sex, or it might be claimed that they failed to adequately communicate their refusal if they had previously been acquaintances or friends, or even had what might be regarded as having had a ‘romantic’ assignation.  Above that, men could reasonably claim ‘mens rea’, that they had a reasonable belief that the woman consented. This ‘reasonable belief’, in the context of a heterosexual and patriarchal sexual culture with sexual roles of masculine assertiveness/initiative and feminine passivity/modesty, was almost always a high standard to break down for prosecutors. The case of Morgan, where a group of men raped Morgan’s wife on his word that she would desire it and regardless of her protests, is instructive: whilst legal appeals against a guilty verdict (rightly) failed, the defence of ‘mens rea’ was specifically supported as a credible one.  

The Sexual Offences Act 2003 substantially rewrote British rape law along the lines of the principle of 'free agreement' as an antidote to this inbuilt bias (section 74). The intention of this legal change was to reorient judicial judgement away from double jeopardy and towards a more balanced consideration of both narratives presented. As such, there would be less focus on the woman's sexual history, dress, and conduct and more focus on the man's explanation for how such a 'miscommunication' took place, what he did to safeguard against such a 'miscommunication'. Effectively, mens rea was required to explain why it was that women could feel they had been raped if the terms of consent were so evident to the man. This at least was the aspiration for the Act. To that end, free agreement was central to the concept of consent in the law (section 75-6). 

Further, the evidential and conclusive presumptions to judging free agreement were supposed to close some of the more offensive exceptions that had resulted in men successfully claiming they had presumed consent from the situation of the sex act, which included: violence or the threat of violence to the victim or a third party (such as their child); detainment; unconsciousness; lack of capacity (expressed as physical disability); stupefaction (such as drink or drugs); deception; impersonation.​[17]​ In this respect, the law appeared to reinforce the feminist criticism that the cultural constitution of gendered and sexual relations placed constraints on women's agency, if this was only partly recognised by identifying common means by which men sought to legitimate or excuse their abuse of women. The broader cultural factors of gendered and sexual language, discourse, ideology and pathology and inter-personal and cultural contexts were beyond the cataloguing of coercive factors because they were embedded within the practices of sexual conduct recognised as between consenting and autonomous adults. In the decade since the 2003 Act, the overwhelming body of research on rape suggests that, however progressive in relation to what it replaced, the law has not achieved its goal of diminishing rape and deterring sexual violence.  


There are a number of underlying causes for the failure of this change in law to be effective, notwithstanding intrinsic problems such as the failure of the legislation to be adequately operationalised in judicial policy and guidelines. The legal change in the 2003 Act has not been accompanied by effective or adequate attempts to use policy or discourse to press for cultural change. Notwithstanding some 'strong' recent TV advertisements, such as a series showing a young man watching in distress his own raping of a girlfriend, there is insufficient co-ordinated attempts to deconstruct traditional masculine constructs of women as both contesting subjects to be acquired, seduced, 'consented' and won, and sex objects seen as an ensemble of parts rather than a responsive agent who needs to be respected and negotiated with intersubjectively rather than moved from aim to consumption. 

Part of the problem lies with the nebulous notion of consent, which is often presented as a process of free agreement but in cultural contexts in which hetero-patriarchal values prevail, is more assent or acquiescence. The medico-moral discourses that have inhibited free and careful verbal reflection and discourse between agents and replaced it with euphemism, indistinct body language, self-conscious doubt as to sexual norms and fetishised public discourse such as porn where women always want sex and can be degraded in that pursuit rob women of power.​[18]​ Worse, as Foucault observes, normalisation means that this cultural imprint of femininity and the 'normality' of male sexual power and women's lesser power or choice, particularly in intimate contexts, means that women will internalise their response in respect of giving 'consent' on perception of expectation, proper male assumption or demand. This is not, in the cases where consent is given, rape, but it is hardly the basis for empowered, democratic and equal sexual relations. Hence consent is elastic and lacks a sense of distinct meaning and is in any case undermined by the constitutive power of discourses of hetero-patriarchy, heteronormativity and gendered (masculine)-normativities.​[19]​  

These are reflected in many of the feminist critiques of sexual consent in hetero-patriarchal societies and on the failures of rape law. At one end of the spectrum of positions is MacKinnon's (1989, p172-174) argument that the sexual contract misrepresents women's subjection to systematic inequality, subjection and brutalisation, with the result that rape is the dominant use of women by men and sexual consent in heterosexual relationships is largely an extension of rape as the choice implied in consent is never freely available. Forced sex is a ‘normal’ part of sexuality and rape is ‘indigenous, not exceptional, to women’s social condition’ and the line between forced and unforced sex is increasingly difficult to discern.  In that context, MacKinnon argues that women's eroticisation of what is their sexual subjection is unsurprising - 'it beats being forced' (ibid p177). Shelia Jeffreys (1990) refines this analysis to see female sexuality as socialised into a passivity to male desire with a masochistic character, or as Mackinnon would have it a desire of violation. Andrea Dworkin (1981) echoes this concern in regarding heterosexual penetration as an act of possession. In these radical feminist accounts the idea of women's autonomy is a fiction perpetrated by and for the benefit of men and as part of a vocabulary by which women's sexual use can be rationalised and normalised, or minimised and made exceptional in its more violent manifestations. 

There are problems with this position, such as the absence of recognition of meaningful women's agency and the denial of an agency where women do desire heterosexual sex, the overemphasis of male power and potency and the grievance many rape victims would take to their violation being characterised as related to their consenting sexual activity.​[20]​ Where it is stronger, however, is providing potent critical arguments that reject the easy attribution of autonomy. Whilst autonomy is rejected, women's agency in these articulations is prescribed and diminished by a determinant critique of male power. 

At the other end of the spectrum is Kate Roiphe (1993, p53-68), whose rejection of feminist discourse on rape and characterisation of the 'rape crisis movement' as a form of moral panic. Roiphe makes a number of claims about women as sexual agents that suggests rape - particularly ‘acquaintance rape’ - is part feminist strategic tool agency or poor management of unwanted encounters from which women either have choice or are culpable for not recognising and articulating choice. This position is clearly predicated upon liberal individualist assumptions about women as autonomous agents that are free to make a meaningful choice and have responsibility for their sexual conduct. Persuasive and coercive techniques short of violence are reduced to being an apologia for feminist defences of women as 'victims' - mentally and emotional weak and infantilised. 

The problems with this position are its lack of empirical substance, denial of a wealth of evidence from women who have been raped and reported rape (if acknowledging the few who do not find rape a devastating experience), and more conceptually a complete disregard for gendered discourses of power in society. For Roiphe the woman is an autonomous agent, which might be regarded as ironic given her post-feminist credentials. The subtleties of a notion of women's agency is unnecessary, since such contextual concerns are secondary to the capacity for free choice. Both this and the model before represent extremes - or one-dimensional notions - of the characterisation of autonomy and agency. One denies autonomy and diminishes agency, the other diminishes agency by arguing from substantial autonomy. 

Between these two positions, there are attempts to grapple with the problem of agency that are more contextually sensitive. For example, Lois Pineau (1995) has argued for the necessity of context sensitivity in looking at rape by insisting on a verbal standard for eliciting consent amongst heterosexuals that she acknowledges may not be equally necessary for lesbian relationships.​[21]​ The particularity of hetero-patriarchy in forming both the context and agent inequalities of power point towards notions of differing standards for ethical sexual conduct. Taking this further, I have argued that - notwithstanding the criticality of acting against the epidemic of rape and sexual violence in contemporary society, the lack of context and agent sensitivity to sexual scripts has an impact even where consent is given, to the point that the quality of consent in many sexual relations is open to question (Reynolds 2004). In both these questions the assumption of autonomy at the expense of an appreciation of agency is a central underlying problem to judging the terms of sexual violence, coercion and rape. 

Certainly, a central problem with the 2003 Sexual Offences Act's amendment to the rape law to replace double jeopardy with 'free agreement' is that 'free agreement' is constituted with the assumption that a judicial process can weight two autonomous voices rather than have to grasp the sensitivities of context and agency that two unequal agents bring in setting out the conjuncture within which an offence may have taken place. If the functional fiction of autonomy is useful to a liberal law that requires individual accountability, responsibility and justice, the price is that that functional fiction leaves sex crimes as one category where the functionality of the fiction of autonomy is questionable. Whilst the problem of reconciling individual and social justice is always intractable, a more agency centred approach to sex law might approach law as the Greeks did, as Nomos - governance where law and culture are conjoined. In that respect, judicial processes would seek to aspire to context and agent sensitivities in developing their modes of judgement on individual cases, and considerably more effort would be spent on cultural change to deprive the most common defences for sexual violence by programmes that made sexual knowledge and discourse more open to lessen, for example, the levels of 'miscommunication' that are so often offered in rape trials. 

Some concluding reflections: Autonomy, Agency and Women. 

John Hoffman (2001, p6-9 & 23-26) has used the idea of a 'momentum concept' to explain how some key concepts, equality, emancipation, freedom and agency, are subject to constant reworking - or more precisely remaking - and development as society develops culturally, politically and materially. A concept like agency is dialectically constituted in its context - its particular historical and cultural articulation - and in its trans-contextual, conceptual ascriptions, which are abstract in a general description and also trace the genealogy of the concept if it does not always expose that genealogy. Hence, often, the user of a concept is confronted by its abstract usage as a building bloc of analysis and does not question how its underlying presumptions and genealogy impregnate its contemporary meanings and uses. Such is autonomy, which composes an understanding of the individual as being constituted by the individual in society, with an eternal and universal abstraction compromised by different and changing contexts in each conjuncture. There is no momentum to autonomy. 

Agency has momentum. Its core of a dialectic of constitutive and self-constitutive processes require that agency is considered in situ - context, conjuncture and situatedness - and conditionally, so that agency is always understood as interconnected with the conditions within which it is conceived. Its abstraction is a signifier of this complexity, not a descriptor of its quality and causality. The idea of the momentum of a concept in its application to social subjects has two important benefits. It allows for the complexity of changing social contexts, so that changes in law or dominant discourse - as in rape law - is not presumed to change substantive and experienced agency or to have the logical or reasoned approach that might be mapped out for it. Second, it situates concepts in context, so that they are never far from being returned to what they are purported to describe and remade with social change. Hence conceptually agents will always be interrogated and autonomous individuals are presupposed before interrogation to have base qualities. As such, the latter have a life beyond their situation. Autonomy is too embedded within the conceptual language of philosophy and the social sciences not to signify important meanings that have developed over time, but that conceptual constitution will always be inferior to the notion of agency. This underlines the value of Roses' observation in the first quotation that opens this discussion. The meaning of concepts are conditional upon their use and purchase. The constitutive nature of agency meet this concern, whilst autonomy retains a sense of impressing meaning beyond use or purchase. 

The example of rape and sexual violence illustrates the bankruptcy of a concept of autonomy that cannot relinquish a free rationality that reflects the presence of men and the conditional absence of women. The functional fiction of autonomy underpins conceptually the agonies by which legal and judicial processes juggle their notion of individual responsibility in such a way as to let dual pathologies or demonization and diminution impact upon women. It is only with an agent sensitive notion of rape and sexual violence that a viable understanding of this problem is conceived: the pragmatism and inherent politics in how rape cases should be judicially managed, beyond the failed 'impartiality' of law to solve the epidemic of brutality; the urgent need for social and cultural change to strike at the root of sexual violence and make changes to the constitutive moments in sexual violence as a strong discourse in contemporary societies; a more sophisticated understanding of the impact of culture, discursive regimes and structural relations in understanding the macrocosm of gendered and sexual relations and the microcosm of intersubjective relations and conduct. 

What is at stake in this conceptual ‘ground-clearing’ is understanding and decoding narratives of rape, sexual miscommunication or consenting sex beyond the volition and free choice of individuals and within contexts, conjunctures and stations where a woman’s agency might be lesser or greater mediated by both individually experienced and socially contextualising factors: knowledge (and education); experience; anxiety; internalised norms; social class; age; ethnicity; sexuality; private/public space; situation; time and intersubjective circumstances. A more sensitive notion of agency is able to comprehend and express the complex weaves of social situations considerably more usefully than the illusion of autonomy. 

When Lewis Carroll's Alice, perhaps with frustration, questions Humpty Dumpty's claim to make words mean what he wants, his reply is to ask who is master - the word or the user. Where rape and sexual violence is concerned, men, indirectly through the constitutive and discursive culture of a gendered and sexualised society rooted in oppressive discourses, and directly through male agency exploiting that advantage, have been masters of words. Words mean what men have said. Whilst it is possible to use words carefully in conceptual discourse, it does not mean they do not create a conceptual construct limited by its roots. Autonomy, however much its intellectual genealogy has been in pursuit of understanding freedom in a complex social world, is a word that in practice supports that mastery. Agency disciplines the user to think more carefully about the problem of who is master of a discourse, where power is located discursively in language culture and their material embodiment in structures and processes, and how more carefully articulated concepts - with their genealogy reflecting their momentum - restore to Alice an equality over words. And if Humpty has to have a fall to recognise the need to change his perception of his mastery and the utility of his words, then that has virtue. 
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^1	  This chapter arises from a paper of the same title presented at the ‘Women and Violence: The Agency of Victims and Perpetrators’ held at the University of Birmingham in 2011. My thanks to the participants for a fruitful discussion and to Herjeet Marway for her editorial comments. The text was substantively written in 2012
^2	  For rehearsals of these conceptual debates see indicatively Tong (2008) and Nicholson, (Ed,1990) 
^3	  Auto Nomos is often translated as 'self  rule' or 'self governance' , though the Greek term Nomos describes law within cultural context rather than simply as abstractive rules and procedures.
^4	  On the concept of autonomy and its thick and thin notions, see Dworkin (1988) 
^5	  See, indicatively,   Antony and Witt, Charlotte (ed. 1993) and .Lloyd (1993)
^6	  Philosophically, this sort of reasoning is best represented within contextualism - see DeRose (1999) and politically and sociologically it appears in critical social sciences, such as Mills (1972) and Bourdieu, and Waquant (1992) It is not to be easily rolled into either relativism or post-modernism
^7	  This is not the ignore the efforts of  women like authors Elizabeth Barrett Browning,  George Eliot and Virginia Woolf,  or activists like Millicent Garret Fawcett , to both promote and build on Wollstonecraft’s writings and example. see  Gordon (2005) and Todd (2000)
^8	  For any reading of Mill see the brilliant Reeves (2008)
^9	  The sexual contract is explored in Pateman (1988)
^10	  On possessive individual see MacPherson (1962)
^11	  Selectively, Foucault Michel (2002a, 2002b, 2003) 
^12	  Examples of the wide ranging literature that explores these complexities includes Heyes (2007) , Crossley (2001)  and Collins, (1990) 
^13	  See Harding (ed - 2003) and Yuval Davis (2011)
^14	  In what follows, I use some rather dated texts to illustrate the discussion. This is substantially because the positions have not changed substantially in the last decade - exactly the impasse this chapter seeks to address. The discussion of feminist theories that follows in relation to rape and consent draws on Moore and Reynolds (2004)
^15	  The discussion here is focused on heterosexual rape. This is not to say that women do not commit acts of sexual violence, nor that other forms of rape, such as male rape, are not important. For the purposes of this discussion, however, the focus is dictated by the distinctions between the different forms of crime and the overwhelming volume  of heterosexual rape, assault and violence. There is a voluminous literature on rape but indicatively, for an overarching discussion, see Horvath and Brown (Eds,2009) Kelly (2013) , Bourke (2008) and whilst dated, Lees (1997)
^16	  On Morgan, see  McGregor (2005) Cowling (1997) and Hinchliffe (2003) 
^17	  http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2003/42/section/75 and http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2003/42/section/76
^18	  See Mort (2000)
^19	  See Connell (1987, 2005) Haywood and Mac An Ghail (2003) and Mac An Ghail (ed - 1996) 
^20	  See Archard (1998, p93), McIntosh  (1992) and Segal  (1994, p219) 
^21	  Whilst it might be argued that same sex relationships are not less likely to have power inequalities and violent conduct, Pineau was exploring the context of hetero-patriarchal relations as producing 'date rapes'. 
